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ABSTRACT 
 
If there is a silver lining to having been tricked in an economic context, perhaps it 
is that one can be wiser for the experience. Presumably, people are able to learn from such 
transactions and avoid them in the future. The current study employed an experimental 
design in which some participants were assigned to a control condition and others were 
told that they had recently been duped. Results indicated that among those who felt 
duped, people high in sucker rumination were subsequently less likely to avoid the source 
of deception. That is, people with a tendency to blame themselves harshly for being duped 
were the least likely to be wiser for the experience. For people high in sucker rumination, 
there is a great deal of psychic discomfort in getting duped, but no silver lining of being 
wiser.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
Most people have had at least one negative financial experience, such as a 
transaction in which they lost money. Some of these experiences are simply the result of 
honest mistakes or unfortunate timing. However, other detrimental financial transactions 
stem from a seller’s unscrupulous motives and actions. Central to the current 
investigation is how people think about financial transactions in which they have been 
scammed or duped. In particular, we used the Sucker Rumination Scale (Preuss, Stillman, 
Mead, and Vohs, 2011, Preuss, Stillman, and Vohs 2014) to measure the extent to which 
people experience negative and aversive self-focused thoughts after being tricked in an 
economic transaction. We sought to understand how individual differences in sucker 
rumination would impact the degree to which one seeks to avoid getting duped in future 
transactions.  
 
Sucker Rumination 
 
Economic exchanges of all kinds require at least some element of trust (Arrow, 
1972). According to an empirical analysis of being duped, "feeling duped involves a sense 
that one's trust was violated" in an economic transaction (Vohs, Baumeister, and Chin; 
2007, p. 130). The concept of sucker rumination does not speak to the degree to which 
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one feels violated, but the degree of self-blame which accompanies violated trust. Our 
expectation was that individual differences in self-blame and other negative self-focused 
thoughts would impact behavior in future economic transactions. Our four hypotheses 
about sucker rumination are specified further below.  
 
The global concept of rumination is considered a personality characteristic, 
(Trapnell, and Campbell, 1999), whereas the term sucker rumination is relevant 
specifically and narrowly to financial contexts. Rumination in the global sense is 
characterized by a repetitive focus on one's negative emotions (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 
2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, and Grayson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, and 
Larson, 1994) as well as a high degree of self-reflection (Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990). In contrast, sucker rumination is defined as the tendency to experience aversive 
self-focused cognitions after being duped in an economic transaction. The similarity 
between the two constructs is that they both entail an unwillingness or inability to let go 
of negative experiences, and the key difference is that sucker rumination is specific to 
being the victim of an unscrupulous financial transaction.  
 
In what is known as the illusion of invulnerability, people are generally reluctant 
to acknowledge the possibility that they can be duped or tricked. However, one study 
found some benefits from learning that one can be tricked (Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, and 
Serna, 2002). In particular, participants rated several advertisements and provided 
feedback as to how persuasive those advertisements were. They were then informed that 
they had been persuaded by deceptive advertisements. Subsequently, these participants 
showed greater skepticism of deceptive — but not legitimate — advertisements. Overall, 
participants who had been duped learned a valuable lesson and were subsequently 
skeptical when appropriate. One crucial assumption of the current research is that the 
process of learning from being duped is uneven and imperfect, such that some people 
learn more readily from being tricked than others. We predicted that the effect of being 
tricked on subsequent behavior would be moderated by (i.e., conditional upon) individual 
differences in sucker rumination.   
 
Sucker Rumination Scale 
 
A six-item scale has been developed to assess individual differences in sucker 
rumination. Sample items include "If I fall for a scam, I repeatedly tell myself that I should 
have known better" and "If I get suckered, it takes a long time for me to forgive myself for 
being so foolish." (See Appendix A for all items). Prior work has established that the scale 
has good psychometric properties, as assessed across a variety of methods including 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (Preuss et al., 2011, 2014). In addition, prior 
work has found that people who are high in sucker rumination experienced a low degree 
of general and consumer well-being (Preuss et al., 2014). In particular, people high in 
sucker rumination made especially negative statements about themselves when 
describing a time they felt tricked in a financial interaction. They were also found to be 
less likely to experience positive emotions and more likely to experience negative 
emotions. People high in sucker rumination were also found to be drawn towards material 
purchases and away from experiential purchases, a tendency which is unfavorable to 
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happiness and well-being (Carter and Gilovich, 2010; Howell, Pchelin, and Iyer, 2013; 
Van Boven and Gilovich, 2003). 
 
Current Investigation  
 
The concept of sucker rumination is relatively new, and relatively little is known 
about it. Prior research has established that people differ in the degree to which they 
experience aversive self-focused cognitions after being duped in an economic transaction 
(Preuss et al., 2011), and that people high in sucker rumination suffer poorer well-being 
(Preuss et al., 2014). Our review of the literature found nothing regarding the marketplace 
implications of sucker rumination. The current investigation sought to determine 
whether differences in sucker rumination led people to be especially careful in avoiding 
the potential of being duped in the future. We use the term avoidance intentions to 
describe the behavioral changes and adjustments one might make to avoid getting duped 
in the future.  
 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b  
 
We identified two plausible yet mutually incompatible hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a) was as follows. People high in sucker rumination, by 
definition, were expected to direct abusive and highly negative thoughts towards 
themselves after being duped. This preoccupation with their own blameworthiness was 
expected to undermine their ability to respond to future situations appropriately. For 
example, imagine a person high in sucker rumination who has been ripped off by her local 
auto repair shop. She may, according to Hypothesis 1a, blame herself so completely that 
she reserves little blame for the auto repair shop. Consequently, she may continue her 
patronage of the auto repair shop that ripped her off. That is, Hypothesis 1a predicts that 
apportioning a high degree of blame to the self reduces the blame apportioned to the 
source of deception, leaving people high in sucker rumination less likely to avoid the 
source of deception. Hypothesis 1a followed this reasoning, and stated that high sucker 
rumination reduces the likelihood of avoiding the source of deception. Hypothesis 1a is 
supported by research in which high levels of global rumination were found to undermine 
problem solving in interpersonal matters (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). In 
other words, a high degree of self-blame in interpersonal matters was found to disrupt 
effective dealing with those matters.  
 
Hypothesis 1b was the alternative to this, and stated that high sucker rumination 
increases, rather than decreases, the likelihood of avoiding the source of deception. 
Following the previous example, this would mean that the high sucker-rumination 
woman ripped off by her local auto repair shop would be more likely than her low sucker-
rumination peers to avoid that shop in the future, as compared to her low sucker-
rumination peers. The rationale for Hypothesis 1b follows is consistent with an analysis 
by Vohs, Baumeister, and Chin (2007), who speculated that rumination in the aftermath 
of being duped would likely be dominated by counterfactual thoughts in which one 
considered how to avoid getting duped. If this reasoning is correct, then it follows that 
people who are high in sucker rumination would be especially likely to think about how 
to avoid getting duped in the future.  
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Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2 addressed the process by which sucker rumination would was 
expected to affect the avoidance of the deceptive entity. Vohs et al. (2007) speculated that 
negative affect was an important part of forming avoidance intentions. In particular, they 
suggested that negative affect drives the kind of counterfactual thinking that would lead 
one to avoiding being duped in the future. According to this view, experiencing negative 
emotions is crucial to the adaptive process that leads to one avoiding a source of deception 
(cf. Ciaracco, Vohs, and Baumeister, 2010). In terms of the repair shop example 
mentioned above, this would mean that the high-sucker rumination customer would 
avoid the dishonest repair shop at least in part due to the negative emotions the event 
provoked. Hypothesis 2 stated that people high in sucker rumination are more likely to 
experience negative affect, which in turn leads to greater avoidance intentions. We use 
the term indirect effect (also called mediational effect) to describe the expected role of 
negative affect.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
 
Under what circumstances would one expect sucker rRumination to increase 
avoidance intentions? We predicted that individual differences in sucker rumination 
would be most pronounced when one had recently been duped. Our prediction is 
consistent with research demonstrating that consumers who have been fooled by false 
advertising tend to be skeptical of future advertising from other sources (Darke and 
Ritchie, 2007; Sagarin et al., 2002). We expected that the effect of individual differences 
in sucker rumination on avoidance intentions would vary based on whether one had 
recently been duped. Hence, Hypothesis 3 stated that individual differences in sucker 
rumination would lead to avoidance intentions primarily after one had experienced being 
duped. We use the term conditional effect (effect (also called moderation) to describe the 
prediction that the impact of sucker rumination was conditional upon having recently 
been duped. It should be noted that Hypothesis 3 was consistent with both Hypothesis 1a 
and Hypothesis 1b; whatever the effect of sucker rumination on avoidance intentions, the 
effect should emerge more strongly in the aftermath of being duped. If sucker rumination 
leads to reduced avoidance intentions, that relationship should be stronger when the 
experience of being duped is fresh in the individual’s mind. If sucker rumination leads to 
increased avoidance intentions, that relationship should also be stronger when an 
individual has recently experienced being duped.  
 
Hypothesis 4 
 
The last and most important hypothesis brings together elements of the previous 
hypotheses. Hypothesis 4 stated that the role of negative affect (indirect effect; 
Hypothesis 2) would vary as a function of whether one had recently experienced being 
duped (conditional effect; Hypothesis 3). This would mean that the extent to which sucker 
rumination led to negative affect, which in turn led avoidance intentions, would be 
stronger following being duped. We use the term conditional indirect effect to describe 
this (also called moderated mediation). Hypothesis 4 stated that the normal process of 
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high sucker rumination leading to negative affect, which in turn leads to avoidance 
intentions, will be strengthened in the aftermath of being duped.  
 
Overview 
 
We tested our hypotheses in an online experiment. There were three main steps to 
our procedure. First, we assessed participants’ individual differences in sucker 
rumination. Second, we administered the experimental manipulation whereby some 
participants were led to believe they had been tricked. Whereas most research on 
deceptive marketplace actions relies on misleading advertisements (e.g., Darke and 
Ritchie, 2007; Obermiller, and Spangenberg, 1998, 2000; Sagarin et al., 2002), we used 
misleading customer reviews. Our reasoning was that customers rely heavily on customer 
reviews when making purchases online (Malbon, 2013), and online purchasing continues 
to grow (“Shopping and the Internet,” 2012). Thus, we expected our findings would be 
relevant and ecologically valid. The third step was to measure negative affect and our 
dependent variable, which was participants’ desire to avoid customer reviews in the 
future.  
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were 200 people recruited for inclusion in an online study. We sought 
to have a broadly representative sample in terms of age and demographics to maximize 
generalizability. The demographic composition of the sample was as follows: 65% White, 
24% Black, 6% Asian, and the remainder was of other races, multiple races, or did not 
report race. Mean age was 36.62 (SD = 13.71). Fifty-two percent of the respondents were 
female.  
 
All participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk. We used the title “Hotel 
Preferences and Survey Questions” within Mechanical Turk and indicated that potential 
participants could expect to spend up to 10 minutes on the survey. We selected settings 
to recruit participants from across the US but not abroad. Participants were paid $2.00.  
 
Procedure 
 
Sucker Rumination 
 
Participants completed the previously described Sucker Rumination Scale (SRS; 
Preuss et al., 2011). To disguise the purpose of the survey, we embedded the SRS within 
the 31-item Consumer Self-Confidence Scale (Bearden, Hardesty, and Rose, 2001). A 
sample item is "I know where to find the information I need prior to making a purchase." 
Participants rated their agreement with each item from 1 (not at all characteristic of me) 
to 5 (extremely characteristic of me). The Consumer Self-Confidence Scale was not of 
interest and was only used to reduce the likelihood that participants could anticipate our 
study aims.  
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Sucker Experience 
 
To induce the feeling of being tricked, we first asked participants to evaluate a 
series of seven groups of hotels, with three similar hotels in each evaluation group. For 
each hotel, participants viewed an image of the hotel as well as a customer review. For 
each of the seven groups, participants were asked to pick their preferred hotel. After the 
last group of hotels was evaluated, we administered the experimental manipulation. By 
random assignment, some participants were given a "Hotel Choice Evaluation" in which 
they were told that "three of the hotels you selected included a phony review." The control 
group simply moved on to the next set of questions (described below) and was told 
nothing about their hotel choices.  
 
To ensure that we successfully caused feelings of being tricked in the experimental 
group, participants were asked (later in the experiment) to indicate their agreement with 
the statement "I have been tricked by customer reviews" from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Results indicated that those in the sucker-experience condition evinced 
higher feelings of being tricked (M = 3.90, SD = 1.72) as compared to the control group 
(M = 2.84, SD = 1.70; F(1,199) = 19.14, p < .001. Cohen’s d was .62, which is above the 
threshold for a medium size effect (.50) but below a large effect (.80; Cohen, 1988). 
Hence, the experimental manipulation was successful.  
 
The low mean in the control group (2.84) suggests that people are generally 
reluctant to state that they have been duped. Most people perceive themselves as not 
having been tricked by customer reviews (or are reluctant to state that they have). The 
mean in the control condition (3.90) was significantly higher than the control condition 
but still below the midpoint of the scale, indicating that participants retained some 
reluctance to state that they had been tricked. The most accurate way to describe the effect 
of the manipulation was that it reduced participant’s disinclination to state that they had 
been duped.  
 
Negative Affect 
 
To understand the role of negative affect, participants completed the Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS assesses 
current affective state by asking participants about 10 components of positive affect (e.g., 
enthusiasm) and 10 components of negative affect (e.g., guilt). Participants indicated 
their current level of each from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely).  
 
Avoidance Intentions 
 
We quantified the degree to which customers sought to avoid customer reviews in 
future purchases with three items: "I plan on avoiding customer reviews in most future 
product decisions," "Customer reviews are not to be trusted," and the reverse-scored item 
"I plan on relying on customer reviews in most future product decisions." Agreement was 
scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Items were summed to create an 
index of avoidance intentions (α = .69). 
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RESULTS 
 
Main Effect—SRS 
 
We regressed avoidance intentions on SRS. Results demonstrated SRS did not 
directly impact avoidance intentions, β = -.08, t = 1.08, p = .28. This did not support 
either Hypothesis 1a or Hypothesis 1b. Although the belief that there cannot be an indirect 
effect without a main effect seems to be widespread, this belief is mistaken (Hayes, 2009; 
Hayes, 2012; MacKinnon, 2008; Zhao, Lynch, and Chen, 2010). Next, we tested for an 
indirect effect.  
 
Indirect Effect — SRS and Negative Affect 
 
We sought to understand whether high SRS scores would lead to greater negative 
affect, which in turn would lead to greater avoidance intentions. First, we observed that 
higher SRS scores were related to higher negative affect, β = .17, t = 2.41, p = .02. Next, 
we observed that negative affect had a robust effect on avoidance intentions, such that 
people high in negative affect were significantly more likely to evince avoidance 
intentions, β = .53, t = 8.71, p < .001. In short, high SRS led to negative affect, and negative 
affect led to greater avoidance intentions. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
 
Next, we conducted a formal test of the indirect and direct effects together in a 
standard test of statistical mediation (see Figure 1). We used the PROCESS bootstrapping 
procedure (Hayes, 2013). Results indicated the presence of mediation: a 95% confidence 
interval for the size of the indirect effect ranged from .003 to .13. Because the upper and 
lower estimates for the size of the indirect effect did not include zero, this indicates the 
presence of mediation. This confidence interval was calculated with 5,000 bias-corrected 
bootstrap sample. 
 
The mediation analysis indicated that sucker rumination led to an increase in 
negative affect, which led to an increase in avoidance intentions. Results also revealed 
that with the indirect effect taken into account, the direct effect of SRS on avoidance 
intentions became significant (b = -.12, se = .04, t = 2.92, p = .005). The direct effect, in 
opposition to the indirect effect, was such that higher levels of SRS led to lower avoidance 
intentions.  
 
In sum, data indicated that the effect of SRS on avoidance intentions was twofold. 
There was an indirect effect, such that people high in SRS were prone to negative affect, 
and negative affect prompted increased avoidance intentions. With the indirect effect 
partialed out, the direct effect became significant, such that higher SRS scores led to 
decreased avoidance intentions. These conflicting effects explain the absence of a 
significant direct effect. Another way to understand the role of negative affect is that when 
negative affect is statistically controlled, the effect of sucker rumination on avoidance 
intentions is strong and clearly negative.  
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Conditional Effect — SRS and Experimental Manipulation 
 
It is only sensible for a person to avoid customer reviews if customer reviews are 
believed to be suspect. Hence, we expected that a clearer picture of how sucker rumination 
impacts avoidance intentions would emerge by examining the effect of SRS on avoidance 
intentions within the context of the experimental manipulation--namely whether one had 
recently felt duped or not.  
 
We conducted a hierarchical linear regression in which we used mean-centered 
terms for SRS scores, experimental condition, and their interaction. In the first step, we 
centered SRS and experimental condition. The simple effect for SRS scores was not 
significant (β = -.07, p = .31), however the simple effect for experimental condition was 
significant (β = .22, p = .002) such that those who experienced being tricked by consumer 
reviews were subsequently higher in avoidance intentions. In the second step, we entered 
the centered interaction term and observed a significant conditional effect, β = .16, p = 
.02.  
 
To interpret this conditional effect, we tested the effect of SRS scores among 
participants in the control condition, and observed a nonsignificant effect (β = .09, p = 
.35). Among participants who had been tricked, we found that lower SRS scores led to 
increased avoidance intentions, β = -.25, p = .02. We found support for Hypothesis 3, as 
the effect of sucker rumination was found in the context of feeling duped. Hypothesis 1a 
was supported, as high sucker rumination was associated with low avoidance intentions. 
Hypothesis 1b was not supported. See Figure 2.  
 
Conditional Direct and Conditional Indirect Effects — 
SRS, Negative Affect, and Experimental Manipulation 
 
In the final set of analyses, we tested the conditional and indirect effects together. 
In the first analysis, we tested for a conditional indirect effect (i.e., moderated mediation) 
— which is to say we tested whether the strength of the indirect effect (through negative 
affect) varied as a function of the experimental condition. There were two ways the 
indirect effect could be conditional. The first is through the A-path, such that the effect of 
SRS on negative affect could vary as a function of experimental condition (Figure 3). This 
would mean that high levels of SRS would lead to especially high (or low) levels of negative 
affect when people felt tricked. To find out, we used PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) with 5,000 
bias-corrected bootstrapped samples. Results indicated a nonsignificant conditional 
indirect effect (coefficient, = .019, se = .19, t = .10, p = .92), such that the relationship 
between higher SRS scores and higher negative affect did not fluctuate as a function of 
feeling duped or not. Said plainly, high sucker rumination naturally leads to negative 
affect. Results again indicated a significant conditional direct effect, this time within the 
conditional indirect effect model (coefficient = .22, se = .08, t = 2.79; p = .006). This 
indicates that the tendency of people high in sucker rumination to demonstrate low 
avoidance intentions—in the aftermath of being duped—is not reduced when negative 
affect is taken into account.  
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The second possible indirect effect is thorough the B-path, such that the effect of 
negative affect on avoidance intentions would depend on experimental condition (Figure 
4). This would mean that high negative affect would lead to an especially low (or high) 
avoidance intentions when people feel tricked. Results were similar to the prior test of 
conditional indirect effect, and indicated a nonsignificant conditional indirect effect (b = 
.09, se = .06, t = 1.54, p = .12). The conditional direct effect was again supported, b = .21, 
se = .08, t = 2.49, p = .014. 
 
In sum, the indirect effect was not conditional, contrary to Hypothesis 4. Said 
another way, people high in SRS naturally experienced higher negative affect, regardless 
of whether they currently felt duped. Likewise, people high in negative affect naturally 
expressed a high degree of avoidance intentions — again regardless of experimental 
condition. However, with these indirect effects taken into account the direct effect 
remained conditional, such that low levels of sucker rumination led to greater avoidance 
intentions, but only in the aftermath of being duped. In short, there were no conditional 
indirect effects, only an indirect effect and a conditional direct effect. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Of the five steps in the consumer decision-making process, the least attention 
seems to be paid to post-purchase behavior. When post-purchase behavior is investigated, 
the research focuses overwhelmingly on the topic of customer satisfaction and customer 
loyalty (Agrawal, Gaur, and Narayanan, 2012; Curtis, Abratt, Rhoads, and Dion, 2011). 
We certainly do not wish to dispute the importance of these concepts. However, when 
someone has been suckered in a transaction, these concepts are of reduced utility — as 
presumably no one who has been duped is satisfied. The current investigation sought to 
advance the understanding of a relatively new post-purchase variable — namely sucker 
rumination — that makes sense in the context of fraudulent exchanges.  
 
The limited research on sucker rumination yields three main findings. First, people 
differ in the tendency towards sucker rumination (Preuss et al., 2011); second, the sucker 
rumination scale is a reliable and valid measure (Preuss et al., 2011; 2014); and third, 
people high in sucker rumination experience poorer well-being than people low in sucker 
rumination (Preuss et al., 2014). The current work extended these findings by 
demonstrating that individual differences in sucker rumination were predictive of 
consumer intentions. 
 
The Persuasion Knowledge Model (Campbell and Kirmani, 2007; Friestad and 
Wright, 1994) argues that one means by which people come to understand persuasion 
tactics is via personal experience. The current research was consistent with this view, as 
people who had been duped reacted in a way that would decrease the likelihood of being 
duped in a similar way again. We also identified variables that facilitated and disrupted 
the avoidance of being duped.  
 
The key variable of interest in the current investigation was sucker rumination, or 
the degree to which one has negative self-directed cognitions in the aftermath of being 
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duped. Data indicated that high levels of sucker rumination were inimical to the 
avoidance of being duped in the future, and low levels of sucker rumination facilitated 
avoidant responding. This fits the pattern observed for global rumination, in that high 
levels of rumination have been found to lead to poor problem solving (Lyubomirsky and 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). However, being low in sucker rumination did not lead to 
undifferentiated avoidance—the effect was only observed among participants who had 
recently been duped. In brief, among participants who had recently been duped, those 
with the most negative and most aversive cognitions were the least likely to demonstrate 
an inclination to avoid the source of their being duped (e.g., customer reviews). This 
suggests an unfortunate implication: the people for whom being duped is especially 
painful and disruptive seem to be the least able to learn how to avoid being duped. That 
is, people high in sucker rumination experience the greatest negative emotional reaction 
to it. Yet this strong reaction does not translate into avoiding the source of deception. 
Hence, people high in sucker rumination are vulnerable to being duped repeatedly.  
 
The data on negative affect were seemingly contradictory. On the one hand, we 
found that high levels of sucker rumination were related to high levels of negative affect. 
Negative affect, in turn, was related to increased avoidance intentions. This would seem 
to suggest that high levels of sucker rumination were associated with high stronger 
avoidance intentions. On the other hand, we found that high levels of sucker rumination 
were associated with low avoidance intentions—in the aftermath of being duped. In 
reality, it seems that there is an element of negative affect that is inextricably entwined 
with those high in sucker rumination, and this naturally increases people’s avoidance 
intentions. Hence, when negative affect is taken into account (controlled for statistically), 
a clear negative relationship emerges between sucker rumination and avoidance 
intentions.  
 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
 
The sample studied in the current research was drawn from a North American 
sample. Results might be different if participants had been from a different culture. For 
instance, research has shown that cross-cultural differences exist for materialism (Ger, 
and Belk, 1996), and materialism has implications for consumer behavior across a broad 
spectrum of variables (e.g., Furnham and Valgeirsson, 2007; Stillman, Fincham, Vohs, 
Lambert, and Phillips, 2012). One should avoid generalizing the results to cultures outside 
North America.  
 
We think the current research could have practical implications. Said plainly, 
beating oneself up over being duped in an economic transaction is worse than useless — 
it is counterproductive. Future research should consider whether intervention strategies 
might help those prone to sucker rumination reduce the likelihood that they will find 
themselves duped repeatedly.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the 
statement is characteristic of you. Please use the following scale.  
  
1 = extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) 
2 = somewhat uncharacteristic 
3 = uncertain 
4 = somewhat characteristic 
5 = extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) 
 
  
 1. After getting duped, I tend to replay my actions and decisions that led up to it for a long time afterwards. 
 
2. 
 
If I fall for a scam, I repeatedly tell myself that I should have 
known better. 
 
3. 
 
If I get suckered, it takes a long time for me to forgive myself 
for being so foolish. 
 4.  
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Long after getting duped, my thoughts keep going back to 
how I could have prevented it. 
 
5. 
 
If I get taken for a sucker, I dwell on it for a long time 
afterwards. 
 
6. 
 
If I get suckered, I spend a lot of time thinking about how I 
can prevent myself from getting fooled again in the future. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
FIGURE 1:  
THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS THROUGH NEGATIVE AFFECT 
 
Notes:  
*    p < 0.05 
**   p < 0.01 
***  p < 0.001 
 
Estimates of indirect effects ranged from .003 to .13, which indicates significance at the 
.05 level.  
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FIGURE 2:  
THE CONDITIONAL EFFECT AS A FUNCTION OF FEELING DUPED 
 
Notes:  
*    p < 0.05 
**   p < 0.01 
***  p < 0.001 
 
The interaction was significant, p = .02. Among participants who had been duped, higher 
SRS scores led to weaker avoidance intentions, p = .02. 
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FIGURE 3:  
THE CONDITIONAL INDIRECT EFFECT ON A-PATH AND THE 
CONDITIONAL DIRECT EFFECT 
 
Notes:  
*    p < 0.05 
**   p < 0.01 
***  p < 0.001 
  
The conditional indirect effect was not significant. The conditional direct effect was 
significant, p = .006  
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FIGURE 4:  
THE CONDITIONAL INDIRECT EFFECT ON B-PATH AND THE 
CONDITIONAL DIRECT EFFECT 
 
Notes:  
*    p < 0.05 
**   p < 0.01 
***  p < 0.001 
 
The conditional indirect effect was not significant. The conditional direct effect was 
significant, p = .01.  
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FIGURE 5: THE INDIRECT EFFECT AND CONDITIONAL DIRECT EFFECT 
 
Notes:  
*    p < 0.05 
**   p < 0.01 
***  p < 0.001 
 
Indirect effects effect size estimates ranged from .003 to .13, indicating significance at the 
.05 level. The conditional direct effect was significant, p = .006. SRS directly reduced 
avoidance intentions after being duped, p = .02.  
 
TABLE 1 
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 SRS Feeling Duped (Experimental Condition)
Negative 
Affect 
Avoidance 
Intentions 
Mean 19.79  0.49  15.27    9.19    
Standard Deviation 5.50  0.50   7.27    3.90    
        
SRS   0.03   0.17   ‐0.08    
Feeling Duped      0.14t   0.22*   
Negative Affect        0.53*** 
Notes:  
t    p < 0.06 
*    p < 0.05 
**   p < 0.01 
***  p < 0.001  
 
